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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
Negligence-Instructions. Blassick v. City of Yakima, 145 Wash. Dec. 287, 274 P2d
122 (1954), was an action for injuries sustained by a pedestrian falling on an allegedly
defective alley crosswalk. The trial court instructed that the plaintiff to recover must
prove one or more acts of negligence "and that such negligence proximately caused or
materially contributed to the accident" The court pointed out that the materially
contributed test is synonymous with the substantial factor test proposed by the Restate-
ment of Torts, 1159, § 431- (1938), but the test should not be used either as a definition
of or a substitute for proximate cause in determining what is actionable negligence.
It was also pointed out that the materially contributed test should be confined to the
fact of causation alone, as distinguished from proximate cause which embraces all policy
considerations that limit liability even though the defendant's conduct is a materially
contributing cause.
Malicious Prosecution-Necessity of Special Injury. In Petrich v. McDonald, 44
Wn2d 211, 266 P2d 1047 (1954), the defendant had brought an action in Admiralty
with a libel for a foreclosure on a preferred ship mortgage and the issuance of an
attachment in rem against the plaintiff's vessel. The action was dismissed in Admiralty,
whereupon- the plaintiff brought this suit for malicious prosecution alleging injury as a
result of the attachment of his vessel. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff the
court held that while a seizure of property may afford occasion for the maintenance
of an action for malicious prosecution such seizure must constitute special injury
"which would not necessarily result in all like prosecution ." As the attachment of
the plaIntiff's vessel was a necessary incident to the defendant's maintenance of his
action in Admiralty such attachment did not constitute special injury, and on which a
suit for malicious prosecution could not properly be grounded.
Libel-Defenses of Qualified Privilege and Fair Comment or Criticism. In Cohen
v. Cowles Pub. Co., 145 Wash Dec. 241, 273 P.2d 893 (1954), an action for libel, the
court indicated that the defense of fair comment or criticism must be based on state-
ments of fact which are true, and not merely on facts which are reasonably believed to
be true. This is the first clear statement of the court's position. The rule was previously
considered in the dissenting opinion in Gaffney v. Scott Pub. Co., 41 Wn2d 191, 248
P.2d 390 (1952). For a discussion of the confusion surrounding the defenses of qualified
privilege and fair comment or criticism, see Comment, An Outline of the Law of Libel
in Washington, 30WAsH. L. REv. 36 (1955).
WIS AND ESTATES
Attestation of Wills-Personal Knowledge of the Genuineness of
Decedents Signature is Necessary. The case of In re Cronquist's
Estate' tests the meaning of attestation by witnesses as used in RCW
11.12.020, which provides, in part: "Every will... shall be attested
to by two or more competent witnesses, subscribing their names to the
n.... . In the Cronquist case, neither of the persons who signed
as witnesses saw the decedent affix his signature to the will nor did
the decedent acknowledge to either that he had so affixed his signature.




The court held that this will was not "attested" within the meaning
of this statute, attestation requiring personal knowledge of the genuine-
ness of the decedent's signature. The opinion points out, however,
that the court is not here faced with the issue whether the requisite
personal knowledge can result solely from an acknowledgment by
testator to witnesses that the signature on the will is his.
The instant case is supported by In re Jones' Estate,' where, how-
ever, lack of personal knowledge of the genuineness of the decedent's
signature constituted only one of several valid grounds upon which the
will was rejected as improperly executed.' The Cronquist will is held
invalid solely upon that ground.
Other jurisdictions having similar statutes have held almost unani-
mously that an acknowledgement alone is sufficient authentication of
the testator's signature.' But until the Washington Supreme Court
settles the point in this jurisdiction, it appears advisable for the testator
to sign his will in the presence of all witnesses.
Revocation of Will by Subsequent Marriage-Contingent Bequest
Held Sufficient to Nullify Statutory Revocation. In In re Steele's Es-
tate,' decedent's will, after leaving his entire estate to his brother,
provided that "in the event that my said brother predeceases me
then I do give my said entire residue estate to Betty Ann Bergman.... "
Subsequent to the making of the will in question, decedent married
Miss Bergman. He was survived by both his wife and his brother.
RCW 11.12.050 provides that if a testator marries after making a will
the will is revoked by operation of law "unless provision has been
made for the survivor by marriage settlement, or unless such survivor
is provided for in the will or in such way mentioned therein as to show
an intention not to make such provision." In the instant case the
court, in holding that decedent's will was not revoked, pointed out
that the sole purpose of the statute is to guard against unintentional
disinheritance of the surviving consort,' and concluded that "uninten-
tional disherison [sic] is here negatived by the naming of Mrs. Steel
in the distributive clause of the will."
Significantly, the court did not decide whether by virtue of this
8 101 Wash. 128, 172 Pac. 206 (1918).
4 This fact was subsequently recognized in In re Chambers' Estate, 187 Wash. 417,
60 P2d 41 (1936).
5 For Comment on this area, see Goodner, Does Washington Law Require Testator
to Sign His Will in Presence of Attesting Witnesses? 6 WASH. L. REv. 84 (1931).6 145 Wash. Dec. 54, 273 P2d 235 (1954).
7 Koontz v. Koontz, 83 Wash. 180, 145 Pac. 201 (1915).
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contingent bequest the spouse was "provided for." Nor did the court
hold that the spouse was "mentioned therein in such way as to. show
an intention not to make such provision." After noting that Mrs.
Steele was mentioned in the distributive clause of the will, the court
reasoned that this mention must have been either with the intent to
provide for her or with the intent not to provide for her. The court
concluded that it was not necessary to determine which intent existed,
because either alternative precludes statutory revocation.
Historically, the disposition .of property by will has been considered
not as an absolute right but, rather, as a privilege, subject to such
restrictions as the state may impose.' The common law has never
absolutely prohibited the disinheritance of heirs at law but has,
throughout its development, maintained safeguards to assure that such
disinheritance is effected -only where it is clearly so intended by the
testator. Prior to the English Wills Act of 1837, the common-law pro-
vided that a marriage followed by birth of issue constituted a sufficient
change of circumstances to create a presumption that the testator no
longer intended any will made, before the marriage to stand.' In
Washington, similar purposes are served by RCW 11.12.050, dealing
with subsequent marriage, and by RCW 11.12.090, dealing with pre-
termitted heirs. Further limitations upon the power of. disposition,
operating for the protection of the spouse, are the "award in lieu of
homestead" statute .(RCW Chapter 11.52) and the law of community
property.
RCW 11.12.090, the Washington statute as to pretermitted heirs,
grants special rights to children "not named or provided for." The
Washington Supreme Court has held that the purpose of this statute
is to assure that no child shall be overlooked by the testator,10 that the
terms "named" and "provided for" are to be considered disjunctively,"
that the designation of testator's children as a class is sufficient
naming 2 whereas the designation "'heirs" is not,1 - and that the term
"provided for" "calls for some beneficial provision which vests directly
and absolutely in the child and. becomes legally available.""
The Steele case appears consistent in tenor, if not in analysis, with
prior Washington holdings respecting. RCW 11.12.050, the subsequent
8 Magaun v. Illinois Trust and -Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
957 Am. JL. § 572; ANN. CAs. 1913D 1319.10 Gehlen v. Gehlen, 77 Wash. 17, 137 Pac. 312 (1913).
1 In re Ridgway's Estate, 33 Wn.2d 249, 205 P.2d 360 (1949).
12 Gehlen v. Gehlen, supra note 10.
i8 In re Ridgway's Estate, supra note 11.
"4 33 Wn.2d at 254, 205 P.2d at 363.
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marriage statute. 5 In In re Adler's Estate6 the court, noting that wills
are ambulatory and speak as of the time of death and that revocation
of wills by operation of law is not favored, held that a provision need
not be in contemplation of marriage in order to satisfy the statute.
The court expressly stated in the Adler case that the provisions of this
statute are in the disjunctive. The later case of In re Hall's Estate'
upheld a will which provided that, in the event of subsequent marriage,
testator's "husband" should take all of her interest in their community
property but none of her separate property. But in the Hall case, the
court in so holding found that the husband was "provided for in the
will or in such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to
make such provision," without specifying whether either or both
alternatives appear. Although no community property existed for
distribution in the Hall case, it is notable that the bequest thereof to
the husband was absolute by the terms of the will.
In the Steele case, the Washington court was faced for the first time
with a bequest contingent by the terms of the will. The rationale
adopted by the court in the Steele case made it unnecessary to deter-
mine whether by such a bequest the spouse was "provided for," and
the court gave no indication as to whether such is the case. Indeed the
Steele opinion indicates that the validity of a will in the face of mar-
riage after its execution hinges solely upon adequate mention of the
spouse in the distributive clause of the will. It would appear that in
future cases regarding the effect of RCW 11.12.050 the court will be
concerned with determining what constitutes a distributive clause and
what constitutes adequate mention rather than with determining
whether a spouse is in a given case provided for or mentioned to show
the intent not to so provide.
Allegation of Revocation by Subsequent Marriage Does Not Con-
stitute a Will Contest. The controversy in In re Gkerra's Estate8
centered around a petition by the surviving widow to declare decedent's
will revoked by subsequent marriage, as provided by RCW 11.12.050.
The petition in question was filed more than six months after the
admission of the will to probate but before the final distribution of the
estate. Respondents maintain that the widow is now barred from filing
28 See Note, Wills-Revocation--Marriage. 6 WAsH. L. Ra,. 36 (1931).
152 Wash. 539, 100 Pac. 1019 (1909).
17 159 Wash. 236, 292 Pac. 401 (1930).
i844 Wn.2d 277, 267 P2d 91 (1954).
[MAY
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
this petition because of RCW 11.24.010, the probate statute of limita-
tion, which provides:
If any person interested in any wil appears within six months imme-
diately following the probate or rejection thereof, and by petition to the
superior court having jurisdiction contests the validity of the will, or
appears to have a will proverr which has been rejected, he shall file a
petition containing his objections and exceptions to the will, or to the
rejection thereof. Issue shall be made up, tried, and determined respect-
ing the competency of the deceased to make a last will and testament, or
respecting the execution by a deceased of such last will and testament
under restraint or undue influence or fraudulent representations, or for
any other cause affecting the validity of such will.
If no person appears within the time aforesaid, the probate or rejection
of the will shall be binding and final as to all the world.
The Supreme Court here held that an allegation of revocation by sub-
sequent marriage does not fall within the scope of this statute and,
hence, an action on this ground may be initiated at any time before the
final distribution of the estate.
To properly evaluate the significance of the Gherra holding, it is
necessary to examine certain prior cases which have contributed signi-
ficantly to the interpretation of RCW 11.24.010. In the early case of
Horton v. Barto,0 the court, in dismissing an allegation of improper
execution of a will, stated broadly that the statute is all-inclusive,
embracing any cause effecting the validity of the will at the time of
probate. In In re Hoscheid's Estate,"0 decided four years later, the
court held on facts similar to those in the instant case that a claim of
revocation by subsequent marriage falls within the scope of the statute.
The Hosckeid case restated and approved the "all-inclusive" interpret-
ation established in the Horton case.
This interpretation was not seriously questioned until the advent of
In re Elliott's Estate,2 in which the Supreme Court held that the offer
of a later will does not constitute a "contest" within the meaning of
the statute here in question and that a court of probate. has authority
to admit such a will to probate at any time prior to the distribution of
the estate. The court's reasoning in the Elliott case merits attention.
After reviewing prior Washington decisions on point, the court con-
cluded that the question had not been definitely settled in this jurisdic-
tion. The opinion then cited a number of holdings from other juris-
1957 Wash. 477, 107 Pac. 191 (1910).
..78 Wash. 309, 139 Pac. 61 (1914)..
2122 Wn.2d 334, 156 P.2d 427 (1945).
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dictions supporting the position that courts of probate have an inherent
power to set aside their own orders admitting wills to probate upon
discovery of later inconsistent wills,2 and announced that the Wash-
ington court is in accord with those authorities. To bolster the adoption
of this position, the court expressed the belief that such a rule increases
the certainty that distribution will be in accord with the wishes of the
testator without unduly interfering with the settlement of estates.
Having adoped the view that offers of subsequent wills do not fall
within the scope of RCW 11.24.010, the court was then faced with the
apparently inconsistent "all-inclusive" interpretation placed upon the
statute in the earlier Horton and Hoscheid cases. The court disposed
of this question on two grounds: (1) that the Horton case and the
Hoscheid case are both distinguishable factually, neither involving a
subsequent will; and (2) that the court no longer adheres to the inter-
pretation of the statute as set forth in the Horton and Hoscheid cases,
stating:
Furthermore, it is now our considered opinion that the term "validity,"
as used in that clause in Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1385 [RCW 11.24.010],
reading "or for any other cause affecting the validity of such will," has
reference only to the genuineness or legal sufficiency of the will under
attack, raising the question, whether the will is legally sufficient in form,
contents, and compliance with the statutory requirements as to execution;
it does not relate to the operative effect of the will or the period of its
operation. In other words, the former will may, as in this instance, meet
all the formal and statutory requirements necessary to make it a valid
will when executed, but yet may cease to have any operative effect simply
because it has been supplanted by a later will .... 23
It may be seen that, while the Elliott opinion made the court's posi-
tion clear concerning admission of subsequent wills, it created and
left unanswered the question of what other circumstances, if any,
"relating to the operative effect of the will or the period of its opera-
tion" fall beyond the scope of RCW 11.24.010. The Gherra case takes
a major step toward settling that question. Against the contention of
the respondent and the determination of the trial court that this case
is controlled by In re Hoscheid's Estate, the Supreme Court, in the
Gherra case, affirms its interpretation of this statute as expressed in
the Elliott case and holds that an allegation of revocation by subse-
quent marriage is not governed by the statute. In deciding the Gherra
22 In re Elliott's Estate, supra note 21 at 352. See also 107 A.L.R. 238 (1937), 157
A.L.R. 1335 (1945); 1 BANCROFTS'S PROBATE PRACTICE, 299 (2d ed. 1950).
2322 Wn.2d 334, 357; 156 P2d 427, 438 (1945).
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case, the court does not expressly overrule the Hoscheid case, recog-
nizing that a factual distinction "may" exist. But the court is express
in repeating its disapproval of the "all-inclusive" interpretation given
the statute in the Hoscheid case.
The Gherra case goes further: by way of dictum it states that
actions based upon the burning, cancelling, etc. of the will (RCW
11.12.040), the subsequent divorce of testator (RCW 11.12.050), a
surviving pretermitted child (RCW 11.12.090), or a lapsed legacy or
devise (RCW 11.12.120), do not fall within the scope of RCW 11.24.-
010 and, like claims of revocation by subsequent will or subsequent
marriage of the testator, may be initiated at any time before final
distribution of the estate.
W. RooE JOHNSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Employers Coyered by Act-Nonresident Motor Carrier. McClung v. Pratt, 44
Wn2d 779, 270 P2d 1063 (1954), was an action for personal injuries arising out of a
collision which took place within the State of Washington. Plaintiffs were Boeing
employees who were riding in the bus of their employer; defendant was a non-resident
trucker who was engaged solely in interstate commerce within the State of Washing-
ton. The defendant contended that under the provisions of RCW 5224.010 the suit of
the plaintiffs was barred, and that the plaintiffs would have to seek recovery through
the procedures provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act. The trial court found
that the defendant was not covered by the act and held for the plaintiffs. This decision
was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court said that the provisions of the act which
made it applicable to employers engaged in intrastate and also in interstate commerce,
did not make it applicable to a carrier engaged in interstate commerce only within the
state. On this ground it was held that the defendant was not covered by the act, and
was not entitled to the immunity granted therein.
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